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VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL DEFAMATION, AND
CENSORSHIP LAWS: THREATENING
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHILE
AND ECUADOR
Ashley Mason*
I. INTRODUCTIONFREEDOM of expression is deteriorating within some Latin Ameri-
can democracies, primarily due to states' disapproving reaction to
controversial media coverage. Focusing on freedom of expression
in Chile and Ecuador, this paper analyzes the ongoing tug-of-war be-
tween a government's desire to control access to public information and
the media's right to inform citizens of matters vital to the public interest.
Officials in Chile and Ecuador are currently using two primary mediums
to inhibit freedom of expression: 1) retaliation through offensive use of
defamation suits, and 2) censorship-through both overt means, such as
complete prohibition of media coverage and interruption of broadcasts
for government-endorsed messages, and covert means, such as violence
and criminal sanctions that invoke self-censorship. Abusive defamation
suits have subsided due to reform in many Latin American countries, in-
cluding Chile, but officials continue to use defamation laws to stifle jour-
nalists' freedom of expression in Ecuador. On the other hand, censorship
remains a critical area of diminishing freedom in both Chile and Ecuador.
Chile is promoting laws that invoke self-censorship by punishing private
individuals and journalists for exercising their right to assemble and pro-
test, and Ecuador has enacted laws that violate the American Convention
on Human Rights' (American Convention) prohibition of prior
censorship.
While this paper asserts that freedom of expression is currently declin-
ing in Chile and Ecuador, each country's unique political and social dy-
namics play a critical role in the status of freedom of expression. This
paper begins by providing an overview of the standards of freedom of
expression under the American Convention, addressing the Inter-Ameri-
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can Court of Human Right's (Inter-American Court or the Court) inter-
pretation of issues that arise with defamation and censorship laws.
Section III focuses on Chile's history of freedom of expression and cur-
rent developments, such as violent reactions to student protests, an Exec-
utive Decree that burdens protesters, and proposed amendments to
Chile's Penal Code. Section IV discusses Ecuador's history of freedom of
expression and current events, including defamation suits, prior censor-
ship through a new electoral law, and censorship through a proposed
communications law.
II. OVERVIEW OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE
AMERICAN CONVENTION
Several treaties define the international standards that protect freedom
of expression: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, the Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information, the Convention on the International Right of Correction,
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, the European Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Conven-
tion, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.' Be-
cause Chile and Ecuador are members of the Organization of American
States, 2 the analysis in this paper will focus on the American Convention,
the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, and the OAS
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. The Inter-American
Court may be perceived as the guardian of human rights in Latin
America, but the Inter-American Court's interpretation of the American
Convention is still in its early stages, as its case law has only begun to
develop within the last decade.3 Free speech violations addressed by this
paper, namely desacato and prior censorship, have already been adjudi-
cated by the Inter-American Court.4
Article 13 is the primary authority that establishes freedom of expres-
sion as a fundamental right in Latin American countries under the Amer-
ican Convention. Article 13 states that "[e]veryone has the right to
1. Freedom of Expression, Hum. Rs. Eouc. AssoCIATEs, http://www.hrea.org/in-
dex.php?doc-id=408 (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
2. Member States, ORG. OF AM. Ss., http://www.oas.orglen/memberstates/authori-
ties.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
3. See Eduardo A. Bertoni, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights: a Dialogue on Freedom of Expression Standards, 3
Euii. Hum. R'rs. L. REv. 332, 333 (2009), available at http://www-ircm.u-strasbg.fr/
seminaireoct2008/docs/Interventions-IV-Bertoni-StrasbourgFINAL.pdf.
4. Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, 9 103 (Feb. 5, 2011); Donoso v. PanamA, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
193, 1 120 (Jan. 27, 2009).
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freedom of thought and expression." 5 Freedom of thought and expres-
sion encompasses the right to "seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print,
in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice."6 As
defined, this right cannot be limited by "prior censorship," but the right
may be restricted by "subsequent imposition of liability," as long as the
law expressly defines the subsequent liability as necessary to guarantee
"respect for the rights or reputations of others; or . . . the protection of
national security, public order, or public health or morals."7 The Inter-
American Court established three preliminary requirements before sub-
sequent liability is permissible: 1) the law must set out restrictions be-
forehand; 2) the limitations must guarantee the "rights or reputation of
others or to protect national security, public order, or public health or
morals;" and 3) with regard to democratic societies, the limitations must
be necessary.8 Moreover, the Inter-American Court's interpretation of
freedom of expression consists of two dimensions, individual and social,
that identify both an individual right to express one's thoughts and a "col-
lective right to receive any information."
The Inter-American Court has recognized two forms of human rights
violations under Article 13 of the American Convention: 1) direct viola-
tions that prohibit free expression, and 2) indirect violations through un-
authorized limitations on free expression.10 The Inter-American Court
has not explicitly ruled on indirect violations.'" But, the American Con-
vention indicates that indirect restrictions may include "abuse of govern-
ment or private controls" or other means that "impede the
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions."I 2 Consequently,
the Inter-American Court has interpreted Article 13(3), which addresses
indirect violations, to mean that states under the American Convention
have an affirmative duty to oversee the effect its private institutions have
on freedom of expression.13 States that have adopted the American Con-
vention "undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized (in the
Convention) . . . and to ensure free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms."14 Therefore, in addition to direct violations, a state's failure
to abolish all indirect "barriers to free and pluralistic communication"
5. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art.
13(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention].
6. Id.
7. Id. art. 13(2).
8. Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, $ 120 (July 2, 2004).
9. Id. 108.
10. See Bertoni, supra note 3, at 335-37.
11. Id. at 337.
12. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 13(3).
13. See Brief for Open Society Justice Initiative et al. as Amici Curiae, Marcel Claude
Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
151 (Sept. 19, 2006), 1 35.
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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violates Article 13 of the American Convention.15 The following
paragraphs will address two ways states often suppress free expression.
A. DISCUSSION OF DEFAMATION AND DESACATO LAWS UNDER THE
AMERICAN CONVENTION
The use of criminal defamation suits to suppress free speech can consti-
tute a violation of freedom of expression.16 Desacato laws, often referred
to as "insult laws," are particularly offensive to freedom of speech be-
cause they "criminalize any 'expression which offends, insults, or threat-
ens a public functionary in the performance of his or her official
duties."'17 Notably, Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Free-
dom of Expression also acknowledges that "[p]ublic officials are subject
to greater scrutiny by society" and asserts that desacato laws inhibit free
expression and access to information.'8 Similarly, Principle 10 states that
civil sanctions should only be available to safeguard the reputation of a
public official or private person who has thrust himself into the lime-
light.' 9 Further, the individual distributing the news must demonstrate
"specific intent to inflict harm" and be "fully aware that false news was
disseminated," or, alternatively, act with gross negligence. 20 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR or the Commission)
has spoken out against desacato laws in the past because they perpetuate
"abuse, as a means to silence unpopular ideas and opinions," resulting in
restricted public debate, an impediment that undermines the foundation
of democratic societies. 21 Even desacato laws-couched in terms of en-
suring public order-violate Article 13 of the American Convention be-
cause "a properly functioning democracy is indeed the greatest guarantee
of public order." 22 Therefore, even offensive speech that arouses contro-
versy should not be restricted because freedom of expression includes
speech that "shock[s], concern[s], or offend[s] the State or any sector of
the population." 23
The burden of proof often determines the outcome in defamation suits.
Fortunately, the Inter-American Court's Donoso opinion suggests a shift
toward a defendant-friendly approach by placing the burden of proof on
15. Id.
16. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Criminal Defamation & the Evolution of the Doctrine of Free-
dom of Expression in International Law: Comparative Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 394 (2006).
17. Id. at 394-95.
18. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm. Human
Rights. Res., 108th Sess., princ. 11 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=26&1 ID=1.
19. Id. princ. 10.
20. Id.
21. "Desacato" Laws and Criminal Defamation, ORG. OF Am. STAES, http://www.
cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=310&1ID=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Pasqualucci, supra note 16, at 388.
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the plaintiff.24 A joint declaration by "the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Free-
dom of the Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Ex-
pression stated that 'the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving the
falsity of any statements of fact on matters of public concern."' 2 5 But the
Inter-American Court's position on the burden of proof in criminal defa-
mation cases remains unclear. 26 For example, in Herrera-Ulloa, the Inter-
American Court-without explicitly holding that the plaintiff must bear
the burden of proof-explained that shifting the burden to the defendant
would result in a "deterrent, chilling, and inhibiting effect on all those
who practice journalism." 27 Nevertheless, the Inter-American Court re-
fused to go a step further and agreed that placing the burden on the de-
fendant violated Article 8's presumption of innocence. 28 The Inter-
American Court's more recent opinion in Donoso represents a shift to-
ward a defendant-friendly approach, stating, "[a]t all stages the burden of
proof must fall on the party who brings the criminal proceedings." 2 9 But
while the Donoso Court protects defendants from bearing the burden of
proving the truth, the Court still establishes limitations on defendants'
right to criticize officials.30
The Donoso opinion, viewed by some as a deviation from the prior
approach in Herrera-Ulloa, also suggests that criminal defamation laws
apply to speech relating to public officials' responsibilities and issues of
public interest.3 1 Relying heavily on Article 11 of the American Conven-
tion, which protects the right to honor and dignity, the Inter-American
Court asserts that Article 11 also protects public officials.32 Donoso's
balancing of speech rights against public officials' honor demonstrates
that a defendant's right to criticize public officials is not absolute. 33 In-
deed, the direction of the Inter-American Court is difficult to predict be-
cause the Court engaged in extensive analysis of the facts unique to
Donoso.34 As a result, the tug-of-war continues even within the highest
court protecting freedom of expression in Latin America. While Donoso
suggests that the burden of proof is no longer an impediment to defen-
dant journalists, Donoso also clarifies that even criticism of officials' pub-
lic duties or comments about issues of public interest may not be fair
game for media coverage.35
24. Donoso, supra note 4, 120.
25. Pasqualucci, supra note 16, at 407.
26. Id. at 408-09.
27. Id. at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 8, $1 176-78.
29. Donoso, supra note 4, 1 120.
30. See id. 1 111-12.
31. Bertoni, supra note 3, at 345.
32. See Donoso, supra note 4, 1 111, 118.
33. Id. I1 110, 112.
34. See id. 1 93.
35. See id. 1 120; Bertoni, supra note 3, at 345.
2012] 373
374 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
B. DISCUSSION OF CENSORSHIP UNDER THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
Censorship laws are another area where the media is vulnerable to
state suppression. Article 13's protection of freedom of expression pro-
hibits prior censorship with two exceptions: 1) regulation of public en-
tertainment for moral preservation of children; and 2) when a state of
emergency arises, thereby allowing the government more flexibility.36
Types of prohibited censorship, which fall outside these exceptions, in-
clude "barring and confiscating publications, prohibiting the release of
movies and television programs for reasons other than the protection of
youth, blocking the content of websites, and halting the publication of
certain newspapers or the broadcasting of particular radio or television
stations."37 Notably, the Inter-American Court has emphasized that the
American Convention's restriction on prior censorship is an "absolute"
and "unique" characteristic of the American Convention that the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights lack.38 The following section discusses the role of desacato laws
and censorship within Chile's history of freedom of expression.
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHILE
A. BACKGROUND OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHILE
While the status of free expression in Chile appears grave, when com-
pared with more progressive democracies, Chile has advanced since its
earlier military regime. Prior to 1973, political freedom in Chile was per-
ceived as a "model" within the Latin American region.39 But General
Augusto Pinochet instituted a military regime from 1973 until 1990, dur-
ing which Pinochet manipulated media sources to spread his anti-demo-
cratic and economic scheme. 40 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
government's regulations and its censorship office exerted control over
the media. 41 Pinochet certainly contributed to the slow progression of
media laws, as his influence extended beyond the end of his military re-
gime in 1990, continuing during his leadership as Commander-in-Chief of
the Chilean Armed Forces and as a senator until 2002.42
1. Defamation/Desacato Laws
In particular, Pinochet passed a desacato law, Article 6(b) of the State
Security Act, which established that "it was illegal for anyone to publicly
slander, libel, or offend the president of the Republic or any other high-
36. Pasqualucci, supra note 16, at 389.
37. Id. at 390.
38. Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 11/96, OEA/
Ser.L/V/1.95, doc. 7 rev. 1 56 (1997).
39. Chile, PRESS REFERENCE, http://www.pressreference.com/Be-Co/Chile.html (last





level government, military, and police officials." 4 3 Specifically, Article
6(b)'s prohibition included "Ministers of State, Senators or Deputies, or
members of the Higher Courts of Justice, Comptroller General of the
Republic, Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, or the General Di-
rector of Carabineros . .. "'144 Furthermore, Article 6(b)'s protections
applied regardless of whether the criticism related to the official's formal
duties. 45 While the State Security Act did not make all criticism illegal,
journalists were only guaranteed protection when their speech was "re-
sponsible and respectful." 46 In addition, under the State Security Act,
Chile punished contempt as "a crime against state security"-a classifica-
tion that stripped away citizens' freedom of expression through shorter
judicial procedures and limited defenses.4 7 For example, the accused
could not defend his right to criticism by proving the truth of the state-
ment.4 8 When charged with an offense under Article 6(b), the accused
lost significant rights, such as the right to "vote in national elections, .
[run] for public office, or leave the country" while on trial.4 9
Human rights groups, such as the IACHR in 1994 and the Inter-Ameri-
can Press Association in 2000, repeatedly expressed concern about the
significant delay in the passage of an amendment to the Security Law.50
Although other Latin American countries retained contempt laws in their
criminal codes, Chile's contempt laws were particularly offensive because
authorities frequently used the laws to silence their critics.51 In 2001, the
Human Rights Watch described Chile as having "more legal restrictions
on freedom of expression than any other country on the continent."5 2
But the Human Rights Watch pegged the judiciary as the primary culprit
of Chile's slow progress toward increased freedom of expression. 5 3 De-
spite Freedom House's classification of Chile as "free" in 2008, current
restrictions on the freedom to protest and proposed amendments to the
Penal Code suggest that Chile is regressing in some areas of free expres-
sion, and progression with respect to contempt laws is still uncertain.5 4
Chile has made progress toward protecting free expression by eliminat-
ing the crime of desacato, which was formerly Article 6(b) within the
43. Id.
44. Hum. RTs. WATCH, CIus: PROGRESS STALLED: SETBACKS IN FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION REFORM 21 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/chile/
chile.PDF [hereinafter CHILE: PROGRESS STALLED]; Press Laws Database: Chile,
INTER AM. PRESs Ass'N, http://www.sipiapa.com/projects/laws-chill.cfm (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2012).
45. See Cinius: PROGREss STALLE), supra note 44, at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18, 21.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 21, 32.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. See id. at 20.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id.
54. See FREEDOM OF THE PREss 2008: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF MEDoIA INDEPENDENCE
88 (Karin D. Karlekar, et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
2008].
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State Security Act.5 5 This amendment was achieved through the Free-
dom of Opinion and Information and Exercise of Journalism Act in 2001
(Act No. 19,733).56 In August 2005, Chile enacted further positive
changes through Law No. 20,048, which reformed contempt laws through
amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Military Justice.57
Key changes included amendments to contempt provisions within Sec-
tions 263-266 of the Criminal Code and Section 461(4) of the Code of
Criminal Justice.58
Despite Chile's progress, the Inter-American Court asserted in
Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile that Chile did not eliminate the contempt of-
fense from the Code of Military Justice. 59 Moreover, the Inter-American
Court characterized the remaining provision in Section 264 of the Crimi-
nal Code, which prohibits threats toward authorities, as "an ambiguous
description [that] does not clearly specify the scope of the criminal con-
duct."60 Further, the Inter-American Court opined that the ambiguity of
Section 264 would result in an expansive interpretation, allowing Chile to
penalize journalists for speech in the same way as the former contempt
provision.61 For that reason, the Inter-American Court recommended
that if Chile retained the threat provision, "it should specify the kind of
threats concerned in order to prevent suppression of freedom of thought
and expression of valid and legitimate opinions or whatever disagreement
and protests against government bodies and their members." 62 Ulti-
mately, the Inter-American Court found Chile violated Article 13 when
the Navy Court-Martial convicted Palamara-Iribarne of contempt for his
negative criticism about the Magallanes Naval Prosecutor in a book he
authored. 63 The Court emphasized that matters of public interest require
"some latitude for broad debate," noting that public debate facilitates
checks and balances that ensure "transparency in State activities" and
"accountability of public officials for their administration." 6 4 Therefore,
while contempt provisions still remain within Chile's Code of Military
Justice, offensive use of desacato laws under Article 6(b) of the State Se-
curity Act has been eliminated.
55. See Comm. of Experts, Mechanism for Follow-Up on Implementation of the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, Republic of Chile: Final Report, Feb. 2-
6, 2004, at 27, O.A.S. Doc. SG/MESICIC/doc.89/03 rev. 4 (2004), available at http:/
/www.oas.org/juridico/english/mec-rep-chi.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, T 63(102) (Nov. 22, 2005).
58. Id.




63. See id. $1 81, 88.
64. See id. T1 82-83.
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2. Censorship Laws
While the current issue of sanctioning protesters invokes concerns of
self-censorship due to fear of subsequent punishment, Chile's history is
replete with examples of prior censorship. In the past, Chile used prior
censorship to prohibit distribution of certain books and movies without
the government's approval. 65 For example, the Inter-American Court
previously addressed censorship in Chile in a case surrounding The Last
Temptation of Christ, a movie that the Chilean National Cinematographic
Classification Council initially permitted, but that the Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court subsequently prohibited. 66 Because Chile was engag-
ing in prior censorship, the Inter-American Court held that Chile violated
Article 13 of the American Convention. 67 The Court also ordered Chile
to amend its laws to eliminate prior censorship and to pay reparations to
the individuals who incurred expenses due to Chile's prohibition of the
movie.68 Similarly, the Inter-American Court found a prior censorship
violation when Chile's government prohibited the dissemination of a
book after publication because the author, a former military officer,
failed to request permission from the military. 69 Issues of prior censor-
ship also proliferated when the State Security Act was in effect, as courts
possessed the authority to require "immediate confiscation of 'any edi-
tion' in which a grave violation of the law [had] been committed."70 Al-
though prior censorship is no longer a significant threat in Chile,
intimidation caused by state violence against protesters and the increases
in subsequent punishment proposed by amendments to the Penal Code
are both precursors to self-censorship.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: CHILE'S INFRINGEMENT ON THE
RIGHT TO PROTEST
Recent student protests have aroused the concern of international
human rights groups, such as the IACHR, as officers have responded to
protests by beating, dispersing tear gas, spraying fire hoses, detaining stu-
dents,71 and using water cannons to break up protesters. 72 Starting in
April, students attending the Central University of Chile rebelled against
65. See Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, T 71 (Feb. 5, 2011); see also CHILE: PROGuReSS S FA! LLI),
supra note 44, at 7.
66. Olmedo-Bustos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, IT 2, 10.
67. Id. 103(1).
68. Id. T 103(5).
69. Pasqualucci, supra note 16, at 391.
70. CHIL: PROGRU1ss STALLED, supra note 44, at 7.
71. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, IACHR Expresses Concern
For Violence Against Student Protests in Chile, Report No. 87/11 (Aug. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/87-11 eng.htm
[hereinafter Report. No. 87/11].
72. Scott Griffen, Press Freedom Deteriorates in Chile: Rising Number of Attacks on
Journalists, INT'L PRESS INsT. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.freemedia.at/home/sin-
gleview/article/press-freedom-deteriorates-in-chile.html.
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the plan to transform the university into a source of profits for a "real
estate consortium" associated with the Christian Democrats. 73 The initial
march consisted of 100,000 students throughout the nation and spread to
seventeen universities and 600 high schools by the end of May.7 4 High
school and college students mobilized their efforts to hold massive dem-
onstrations, which have resulted in carabineros (military police) arresting
thousands, spawning "bloody street fight[s]." 75 Notably, in August 2011,
a crowd of a million people joined the forty-eight hour strike that led to
the shooting and death of a sixteen-year-old protester, Manuel Gutidrrez
Reinoso, by a carabinero.76 Until a carabinero killed Reinoso-a student
protester who did not instigate violence-the government failed to initi-
ate a discussion with students.77
Carabineros have also threatened the press's right to report about pro-
test events.78 Carabineros have beaten reporters and journalists who
were documenting a general strike.79 Similarly, officers have broken into
a local media channel's office to wipe out unfavorable coverage, while
also threatening employees.80 Journalists and cameramen have exper-
ienced attacks by water cannons,8' tear gas, 82 and "masked individu-
als."83 Moreover, special-forces groups have gone further by forcefully
detaining and destroying a managing editor of an online journal's footage
for reporting about student demonstrations. 84
1. Executive Decree 1086
Chile's Executive Decree 1086 of 1983 has also burdened protesters'
right to assemble by requiring individuals to obtain permission from the
government to hold a public protest.85 Under Decree 1086, if a group
intends to hold a protest in a plaza, street, or other public place, the orga-
nizer must give two days notice of the protest to the appropriate govern-
73. The New Battle of Chile for Free, Quality Public Education Workers to Power!,
INTERNATIONAIsr (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.internationalist.org/newbattle-





78. See generally Griffen, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. More Media Freedom Violations Feared in Protests Called for Today and To-
morrow, Reies. Wrniour BoRiDiRs (Oct. 18, 2011), http://en.rsf.org/chile-more-
media-freedom-violations-I 8-10-2011,41233.html.
82. Id.
83. Griffen, supra note 72.
84. Id.
85. Joe Hinchlifee, Human Rights Commission denounces Chilean Carabineros for
'disproportionate use of force', MERCO PRESS (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://
en.mercopress.com/2011/11/03/human-rights-commission-denounces-chilean-
carabineros-for-disproportionate-use-of-force; ASOCIACION DE ORGANISMOS NO
GUDE3RNAMENTALUS ET AL., HUMAN Riivri's SITUATION IN CHILE 2011 5 (2011),
available at http://observatorio.cl.pampa.avnam.net/sites/default/files/biblioteca/
sintesis derechos humanos en chile 201 lingles.pdf.
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ment representative. 86 The notice not only has to be in writing, but also
must contain the organizer's name, residence, and identification card
number.87 Decree 1086 also requires demonstrators to disclose informa-
tion about the demonstration itself, such as where the demonstration will
start and finish, who will speak, and how the demonstration will be dis-
persed.88 Further, if the demonstrators carry sticks, canes, irons, bars,
chains, or a similar instrument, security officers may require that the
demonstrators surrender those items.89 If the demonstrator refuses, the
officer will break up the protest. 90 Moreover, if the demonstrators do not
give the required notice or disclosures, the security forces can prohibit or
dissolve the protest or march. 91 Also, demonstrations cannot occur
within high traffic areas where a protest would interfere with the public. 92
For example, the Minister of the Interior has relied on this Decree to
prevent student protesters from marching on Alameda, a primary street
in Santiago.93
2. Analysis of the IACHR's Reaction
Although this issue has only arisen within the last year, the state's
abuse of protesters and reporting journalists has already attracted scru-
tiny by the IACHR. 94 In August 2011, the IACHR distributed a press
release, relaying its disagreement with violence against student protes-
ters.95 In October 2011, the IACHR acknowledged the threat to freedom
of expression in Chile again through a hearing initiated by the Programa
Asesoria Ciudadana del Instituto Igualdad (the petitioner), which argued
that Chile must revise its legal framework.96 The petitioner brought this
issue before IACHR's Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression af-
86. Law No. 1086, Septiembre 16, 1983, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 2(a) (Chile).
87. Id. art. 2(b).
88. Id.
89. Id. art. 2(f).
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 2(a).
92. Id. art. 2(c).
93. Gobierno confirma 874 detenidos a nivel nacional y 90 carabineros heridos tras
protestas estudiantiles, NACIONAL (Aug. 5, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.latercera.
com/noticia/nacional/2011/08/680-384341-9-gobierno-confirma-874-detenidos-a-
nivel-nacional-y-90-carabineros-heridos-tras.shtml, translated in: Harshest Repres-
sion yet for Student Demonstrations, L0-DE-ALLA.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011, 7:38 PM),
http://lo-de-alla.org/2011/08/chile-harshest-repression-yet-for-student-demonstra-
tions/ [hereinafter Harshest Repression]; Inidito y masivo caceroleo de anoche im-
pulsa y legitima al movimiento estudiantil, Ei Mos-rRADoo (Aug. 5, 2011), http://
www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/08/05/inedito-y-masivo-caceroleo-de-
anoche-impulsa-y-legitima-al-movimiento-estudiantil/, translated in Harshest Re-
pression, supra; Alejandra Carmona, "La tinica salida que veo es el plebiscito", El
MOS-raADOR (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/08/05/la-
unica-salida-que-veo-es-el-plebiscito, translated in Harshest Repression, supra.
94. See generally Rachel Curtis, Human Rights and Public Protest in Chile, Hum. R-rs.
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ter 117 documented allegations of police violence during student pro-
tests. 97 The petitioner alleged half of the arrests at issue were illegal, and
approximately ninety of the cases involved excessive force by the po-
lice.98 For instance, carabineros tortured Bravo Pifia, a student protester
among the 500 protesters arrested during a national strike, by
"waterboarding" him.99 The petitioner emphasized four primary reasons
for its complaint against Chile. 00 First, the petitioner described Chile's
law as "outdated and unethical."' 0 ' Second, the petitioner argued the
carabineros' force toward student protesters was "unnecessary" and "un-
justified." 0 2 Third, carabineros frequently used violence against detain-
ees in their patrol cars. 03 Finally, the Chilean state has not punished
carabineros for crimes against protesters, as trials often occur in military
courts.10 4 Notwithstanding the petitioner's evidence of police abuse, the
Chilean Minister of the Interior disregarded the petitioner's complaint as
solely an issue of protester violence, denying any fault with Chile's speech
laws.105 Further, Mr. Heriberto Navarro, representing the carabineros,
stated that five carabineros were punished for using violence to break up
the protest.106 The result of the hearing was that Chile refused to accept
any responsibility for the carabineros' unjustified suppression of protes-
ters' speech.
The IACHR's recent press release regarding student protests also cau-
tioned Chile that "any restriction of [the fundamental rights to associa-
tion, assembly, and freedom of expression] should be justified by an
imperative social interest." 07 In essence, the IACHR advised Chile to
take reasonable action, observing "principles of legality, necessity, and
proportionality," but dispersing a protest is not permitted unless a duty
arises to protect the people.108 The Commission was explicit that resort-
ing to force should be "exceptional" and "strictly necessary" in considera-
tion of international law.109 Moreover, the Commission emphasized that
the state must observe "special consideration" when dealing with chil-
dren-student protesters in this case-to avoid "violence of any kind.", 10
Conversely, a recent decision by the Inter-American Court casts some
doubt on whether violence against protesters would violate Article 13(3)
97. Benjamin Witte, Widespread Abuse Allegations Amid Police Crackdown on Chile

















of the American Convention, which relates to indirect interference with
freedom of expression. Nevertheless, Chile's restriction on the rights of
protesters and journalists would likely-at a minimum-constitute a vio-
lation under Article 13(1) of the American Convention.1 ' In Perozo v.
Venezuela, the Court found a violation under Article 13(1), which pro-
tects a general right to freedom of expression, but refused to find a viola-
tion under Article 13(3).112 The Court acknowledged that indirect
violations could amount to a violation under Article 13, stating "[i]t is
possible to illegally restrict such freedom by the legal or administrative
actions of the State or by de facto conditions that put, directly or indi-
rectly, in a situation of risk or greater vulnerability those who exercise or
attempt to exercise . . . freedom [of expression]."' 13 Moreover, the Inter-
American Court recognized the State's duty to "abstain from acting in a
way that fosters, promotes, [or] favors" violations of rights protected
under the American Convention. 114 Further, the State must "adopt,
whenever appropriate, the measures that are necessary and reasonable to
prevent or protect the rights" provided in the American Convention)-' 5
On the other hand, the violence associated with protests in Chile can
likely be distinguished from the result in Perozo, where much of the in-
terference with freedom of expression was caused by private individuals
who surrounded the media when reporting on scene.116 In Chile, the
carabineros who initiated violence against protesters would likely be con-
sidered state agents.117 In fact, Chile could be held responsible for the
acts of carabineros, in their official capacity as state agents, "even if they
act outside the limits of their sphere of competence or in violation of
domestic law."' 1 8 In contrast to Chile's blatant disregard for the safety of
journalists, the Court emphasized in Perozo that the police held meetings
before protests occurred to ensure that "special protective measures"
were in place to protect journalists.1 19 In Perozo, pre-planning militated
in favor of the State-a significant fact that carabineros lack in their
favor. In addition, the Inter-American Court has emphasized that the
government must allow its security forces to use force only in "excep-
tional circumstances" and only after "all other methods of control have
been exhausted and failed." 120 As discussed above, carabineros' use of
violence has likely exceeded ordinary force, as a student protester who
posed no serious threat was killed.121 Without additional evidence of the
111. See Perozo v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 195, [ 426 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec1 95-ing.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id. 1 118.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. 99 169, 174, 178, 182.
117. See id. 118.
118. See id. 9 130.
119. Id. 164.
120. Id. 1 166.
121. The New Battle of Chile, supra note 73.
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State's failed efforts to control the crowds for purposes of public safety,
Chile would have difficulty defending its actions under Article 13's stan-
dard. Although the Court is more reluctant to find an indirect violation
under Article 13(3), the egregious nature of Chile's interference with
protesters' demonstrations would likely distinguish this case apart from
Perozo.
3. Proposed Change to Chile's Penal Code
Especially in light of Chile's motive to suppress the recent protests,
Chile's proposed change to the Penal Code represents a serious infringe-
ment on individuals' fundamental right to free speech, assembly, and
press. In October 2011, Chile's President Sebastian Pifiera proposed an
amendment, asserting that the definition of public unrest, defined in Arti-
cle 269 of the Penal Code, must be expanded. 122 Article 269 currently
states:
Those who seriously disturb public peace in order to cause damage
or other harm to another individual or with another reprehensible
end, may be subject to the minimum level of imprisonment [61 days
... ] in addition to the sanctions imposed for related damages. Those
who obstruct or hinder actions by personnel of the Fire Department
or any other public service in charge of controlling a disaster, acci-
dent, or other calamity that constitutes a danger to the safety of indi-
viduals will incur a penalty of imprisonment of a minimum of a
medium level.123
President Pifiera's proposed amendment would enact the following
changes: "add the crime of sacking and looting and increase the sanction
applicable to the crimes of public unrest in marches and protests; invad-
ing or occupying private property; causing disruption of transportation or
public services, and treating public officials with disrespect or con-
tempt." 12 4 The amendment assigns heightened sanctions to these crimes,
including imprisonment from eighteen months to three years.125 Further,
the amendment would allow law enforcement to "request the voluntary
transmission of recordings, film or other electronic media material" to
provide evidence of crimes instead of requesting the state prosecutor to
issue an order.126 Moreover, President Pifiera has already acted on his
initiative to discourage protesters from exercising their rights.127 Presi-
dent Pifiera has prosecuted violators under Decree 1086, including stu-
122. See Chile: Proposed Changes to the Penal Code to Increase the Sanction against
Public Unrest, LIR. CONGRESS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/




126. Bill Would Criminalize Protests, Turn Journalists into Police Informers, RIep.
Wrrniour BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://en.rsf.org/chile-bill-would-criminalize-
protests-06-10-2011,41137.html [hereinafter Bill Would Criminalize Protests] (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
127. See Witte, supra note 97.
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dent protestors who burned a city bus and taxi drivers who disrupted
main areas in Santiago to advocate for subsidies and a decrease in fuel
costs under state security laws.12 8
a. Reaction by Human Rights Groups
Human rights groups, such as Reporters Without Borders, have op-
posed the proposed amendment, insisting the bill is another tactic to
squelch student protests.129 These groups anticipate that law enforce-
ment will have considerable discretion when interpreting "occupying"
property, suggesting that even a non-violent sit-in on university or church
property could fall within the amended provision's reach. 30 If non-vio-
lent student sit-ins result in criminal sanctions, the proposed amendments
are a type of "censure" that may violate the self-expression provisions of
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.13' While Re-
porters Without Borders agrees that violence against carabineros war-
rants punishment, the state should likewise punish carabineros for violent
retaliation against protesters.132 Notably, Reporters Without Borders is
particularly opposed to the provision that permits police to obtain press
material to corroborate suspected crimes against public order.'33 The
proposed amendments would empower the police with the discretion to
acquire media coverage to locate suspects, ignoring procedures for col-
lecting evidence and violating journalists' confidentiality. 13 4
The IACHR has addressed when state intervention is appropriate
under Articles 13(2) and 13(3) of the American Convention.'13 The
Commission stated "the zone of legitimate State intervention begins at
the point where the expression of an opinion or idea interferes directly
with the rights of others or constitutes a direct and obvious threat to life
in society."136 Further, the Commission recognized that State interven-
tion is especially threatening to the people's right to freedom of expres-
sion when the state elects to use criminal sanctions to restrict
expression.137 Given the chilling effect that results from subsequent
criminal liability, the State can only criminalize speech in "exceptional
circumstances when there is an obvious threat of lawless violence."' 38
While the size of the protests inevitably causes some interruption, the
protest movement likely does not rise to the level of a "direct and obvi-
128. Id.
129. Bill Would Criminalize Protests, supra note 126.
130. Griffen, supra note 72.
131. Id.
132. Bill Would Criminalize Protests, supra note 126.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Rodolfo Robles v. Peru, Case 11.317, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 20/99,
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ous threat to life in society."' 39 Further, when carabineros arrest
thousands of protesters, a "chilling effect" will likely result. The pro-
posed change to the Penal Code also does not limit subsequent criminal
liability to "exceptional circumstances when there is an obvious threat of
lawless violence."1 40
b. Violations under the American Convention and Inter-American
Declaration
The proposed Penal Code likely violates the Inter-American Court's
interpretation of Articles 15 and 29(a) of the American Convention.141
The proposed revision to the Penal Code increases the sanctions related
to public unrest and protests, thereby restricting the freedom of assembly
recognized in the American Convention.142 Article 15 of the American
Convention provides for "peaceful assembly, without arms;" however,
the Convention also recognizes that some permissible limitations may be
necessary for a democracy, such as "national security, public safety or
public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or free-
dom of others."143 Notwithstanding Article 15's inclusion of "public or-
der," the IACHR does not endorse public order as a broad justification to
suppress protesters, given the importance of freedom of expression.144
Further, Article 29(a) does not permit "any State Party, group, or person
[from] suppress[ing] the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognized in this Convention or [from] restrict[ing] them to a greater
extent than is provided for herein." 145 The Inter-American Court stated,
"'[p]ublic order' or 'general welfare' may under no circumstances be in-
voked as a means of denying a right guaranteed by the Convention or to
impair or deprive it of its true content."146 Despite the counter-argument
that the protest movement endangers public safety and order, the in-
creased punitive sanctions and seizure of the media's coverage will not
likely comply with the American Convention's standards.
Proposed amendments to Chile's Penal Code are also likely to violate
numerous principles under the Inter-American Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression.147 Principle five bans "[p]rior censorship, di-
rect or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression,
opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written,
artistic, visual or electronic communication."1 4 8 While the amendments
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Bertoni, supra note 3, at 334; see also Report No. 87/11, supra note 71.
142. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 15; see also Chile: Proposed Changes,
supra note 122.
143. Id.
144. See Report No. 87/11, supra note 71.
145. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 29(a).
146. Bertoni, supra note 3, at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. See Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 18, princ. 5, 8-
9.
148. Id. princ. 5.
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invoke subsequent punishment rather than prior censorship, the pro-
posed sanctions would likely constitute the requisite "pressure" that the
Organization of American States intended to prohibit when drafting the
principles.149 Further, principle eight states that "[e]very social commu-
nicator has the right to keep his/her source of information, notes, per-
sonal and professional archives confidential."1 5 0 While the proposed
amendments only require "voluntary transmission of ... media material,"
the new provision may pressure journalists to act as informants of the
State, while improving the State's ability to accumulate evidence to im-
pose sanctions on protesters.151 Further, principle nine prohibits "mur-
der, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators"
and "material destruction of communications media," recognizing these
actions as encroaching on freedom of expression.152 If the State contin-
ues to allow carabineros to detain and physically abuse reporters covering
the protests, Chile would certainly violate principle nine. 53
As the proposed amendments impose criminal sanctions, the three pre-
liminary requirements for subsequent punishment recognized by the In-
ter-American Court must also be satisfied.154 Even though the
restrictions will be explicitly established in the Penal Code, it is doubtful
whether the expanded coverage of the sanctions will satisfy the Inter-
American Court's other preliminary requirements. For example, subse-
quent punishment for "occupying private property" or "treating public
officials with disrespect or contempt" may not be necessary limitations on
a democratic society.' 55 Further, a case-by-case determination is needed
to ensure the Code is applied in a way that protects the "rights or reputa-
tions of others" and "national security, public order, or public health or
morals," as there is potential for abuse of freedom of speech rights when
the government disfavors citizens' involvement in a particular move-
ment.156 Although the above discussion revealed significant weaknesses
in Chile's freedom of expression, the following discussion of Ecuador sug-
gests that threats to freedom of expression necessitate urgent change.
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ECUADOR
A. BACKGROUND OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ECUADOR
A poll in 2010 revealed that thirty-two percent of the population be-
lieves there is no freedom of expression in Ecuador-a devastating reality
149. See id.
150. Id. princ. 8.
151. See Bill Would Criminalize Protests, supra note 126.
152. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 18, princ. 9.
153. See id.; see also Curtis, supra note 94.
154. Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, T 120 (July 2, 2004).
155. See Chile: Proposed Changes, supra note 122.
156. See Herrera-Ulloa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 1 120.
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that has been evident throughout the nation's history.'57 Some have
characterized free speech as being "under constant threat by the govern-
ment."' 58 But even after a legacy of hostility toward the media-Sixto
Durin-Ball6n, Gustavo Noboa, Abdali Bucaram, and Lucio Gutidrrez-
current Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa has superseded his prede-
cessors' anti-media reputations by "transform[ing] the private media into
his most lethal rivals."' 59 In 2007, the Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression began heavily criticizing Ecuador's policies
and its punishment of journalists with criminal sanctions. 60 Before 2007,
the State controlled one radio network.161 Since 2007, the government
has gained extensive control over the media.162 The government's own-
ership now consists of "20 media companies, 5 television stations, and
several widely-read newspapers."16 3 As a result, the State has used its
control over media networks to humiliate political rivals and controver-
sial journalists.164 Further, Ecuador's new Constitution, as revised in
2008, permits the government to exercise greater control over the content
that the media releases.165 Article 19 states that "[t]he law shall regulate
the prevalence of contents for informative, educational and cultural pur-
poses in the programming of the media, and shall foster the creation of
spaces for the dissemination of independent national production." 6 6
When President Correa was elected in January 2008, he exacerbated
the existing discord between State officials and the media by invoking a
"divisive tone" toward the press through continual criticism and criminal
defamation lawsuits. 167 President Correa has referred to the media as
"'savage beasts,' mediocre, corrupt, mafiosi, and 'more unpleasant than
pancreatic cancer.' "168 In fact, President Correa publicized as of July
2008 that he would no longer participate in media interviews or press
conferences, restricting any communication with the media to writing
only.169 Nevertheless, President Correa insisted that broadcasters allow
him a right to lengthy rebuttals in response to his critics, suppressing im-
157. See U.N. Eouc., SCIENTIC & CUI TURAL ORG., ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA Duv. IN
EcUADoR-2011, at 24, UNESCO Doc. EC/2011/CI/PI/18 (2011).
158. Olga Imbaquingo, Ecuador: Media Caught in the Crossfire between a Popular Pres-
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portant news of public interest.' 70 In addition, President Correa retali-
ated against certain media groups after the press criticized the legitimacy
of contracts between the government and President Correa's brother.171
In response to the press's criticism, President Correa created Executive
Decree No. 1793 to prevent public businesses from advertising in numer-
ous newspapers, including El Comercio, El Universo, La Hora, Expreso,
and Vanguardia.172 Because the national government is the primary ad-
vertising source for Ecuador's media, media groups that publish contro-
versial remarks about the government are vulnerable to political
discrimination. 173
Designated as "partly free," Ecuador's law does contain provisions that
protect freedom of speech generally-albeit often convoluted by provi-
sions that also limit free speech.174 Article 66-6 of the 2008 Constitution
ensures individuals "[t]he right to voice one's opinion and express one's
thinking freely and in all of its forms and manifestations."1 75 Conversely,
Article 18-1 of the Constitution contains limitations regarding which
speech can be freely received and disseminated.'7 6 To be covered, speech
must be "truthful, verified, timely, contextualized, plural, uncensored in-
formation about facts, occurrences, and processes of general interest."' 77
As the IACHR's Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression es-
tablishes, "[p]rior conditioning of expressions, such as truthfulness, time-
liness or impartiality is incompatible with the right to freedom of
expression."' 78 Therefore, despite the Constitution's protection of free
expression, Article 18-1 violates the IACHR's Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Freedom of expression is rapidly deteriorating due to the proliferation
of defamation suits promoted by President Correa's "attack" on the me-
dia's right to publish or broadcast critical remarks about his leadership.17 9
Further, President Correa's administration has endorsed an electoral law
that infringes on media coverage of the upcoming election and a commu-
nications law that authorizes a Communication and Information Coun-
170. Carlos Laurfa, Confrontation, Repression in Correa's Ecuador, COMMIrrE PRO-
TECr JOURNALISTs (Sept. 1, 2011, 9:12 AM), http://cpj.org/reports/2011/09/con-
frontation-repression-correa-ecuador.php.
171. Press Release, Inter Am. Press Ass'n, IAPA Disappointed at Retaliatory Position
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174. See FREEDOM OF -HE1 PREss 2008, supra note 54, at 117.
175. C.P. art. 66(6).
176. C.P. art. 18(1).
177. ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA Dpv. IN ECUADOR-2011, supra note 157, at 28.
178. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 18, princ. 7.
179. See El-Hage, supra note 160, at 3, 7.
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cil.180 The Council will regulate the media, which includes requiring the
media to distribute messages from the President and governmental
agencies.'18
1. President Correa's Pattern of Aggressive Criminal Defamation Suits
The article "No to lies" by Ecuadorian journalist Emilio Palacio Urru-
tia (Palacio) has recently exposed daunting problems with suppression of
speech through criminal defamation suits in Ecuador.182 Palacio's article
appeared in the opinion portion of the Ecuadorian newspaper El
Universo's website. 83 The article contained allegations that President
Correa "ordered troops to fire at will and without warning on a hospital
full of civilians and innocent people, . . . pardoned drug trafficking mules,
... cultivated a great friendship with land invaders," and made land in-
vaders "into members of the legislative assembly, until they betrayed
him."184 In response to the article, President Correa sued Palacio and
three executives of El Universo for slanderous libel on March 21, 2011.185
In July 2011, a magistrate judge held that Palacio and the executives vio-
lated Articles 489, 491, and 493 of Ecuador's Criminal Code, resulting in
fines of thirty million U.S. dollars for Palacio and the executives and an
additional ten million U.S. dollars for El Universo.186 Ecuador's highest
court, the National Court of Justice, upheld the judgment in February
2012, including jail sentences of three years.187 Palacio is currently seek-
ing asylum in the United States due to Ecuador's persecution of journal-
ists in violation of the right to freedom of expression.' 88 He currently
resides in Miami, Florida, where he has received threats from individuals
associated with President Correa.189
Due to mounting international pressure, President Correa pardoned
Palacio and El Universo on February 27, 2012.190 Palacio explained, "I
saw today's speech as a defensive reaction against the national and inter-
national pressure he was facing . . . . But he was quite clear that his fight
against the media would continue."' 9 ' Even though President Correa's
judgment against Palacio has been pardoned, Palacio will still not return
180. Ecuador Politics: Squeezing the Media, VIEWSWIRE (Feb. 8, 2012), http://view-
swire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWPrintVW3&article id=958799480.
181. AssiessMENr OF MEDIA DFiv. IN EcuAnoi-2011, supra note 157, at 36.
182. See El-Hage, supra note 160, at iv.
183. See id. at 6.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 7.
186. Id. at 9.
187. Simon Tegel, Ecuador Libel Case Pits Correa Against the Press, GLOBALPOSTI (Feb.
26, 2012, 9:48 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/
120224/ecuador-libel-case-rafael-correa.
188. Alejandra D. Camacho, Ecuador 13/02/2012, PULSAMIRRICA (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2012/02/13/ecuador-this-week-49/.
189. Id.
190. Jim Wyss, Ecuador President Issues Pardons in Libel Cases, MIAMI HERALD (Feb.
27, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/27/2663694_p2/ecuador-president-
issues-pardons.html.
191. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to Ecuador due to a pending criminal defamation suit against him by a
television station.1 9 2 Despite President Correa's victory over the press,
he poses as the victim, accusing El Universo of reckless misrepresentation
of the facts:
[C]itizens, let's react, let's sue not only the slanderer, the instrument,
but also the head, the one who allows those attacks, [ ... ] I would
have been willing to talk, but after this attack, what else is left to do
for a person with principles and honor? [ . . . ] [I]f it (El Universo)
goes bankrupt, it is their fault, they have to take responsibility [ ... ]
in this case the culprits are those irresponsible people who used a
newspaper to spread lies and slander; let's assign responsibilities so
that things don't get confused. 93
While President Correa's remark emphasized his principles and honor,
it also degraded the media by describing them as "culprits."1 94 Beneath
the victimized fagade, President Correa's response reveals his initiative to
minimize the media's freedom to criticize officials.
Ecuador's Criminal Code prohibits eight types of defamation, of which
Palacio and El Universo allegedly violated Articles 489, 491, and 493.195
Article 489 distinguishes between the forms of libel, defining slanderous
libel as a statement that "consists of the false imputation of a crime." 196
Conversely, libel is "'non-slanderous' when it consists of all other state-
ments to discredit, dishonor, or disparage another person, or any other
action performed with the same aim." 97 When compared with other
forms of defamation, Palacio's three year prison sentence is the maximum
sentence provided for in the Code.198 Moreover, human rights groups
have indicated that unlawful political pressures influence courts' deci-
sions as to which provision will apply.' 99 Consequently, President Cor-
rea's position likely influenced the seriousness of Palacio's and El
Universo's punishment. Even though Palacio's remarks about President
Correa were offensive, his article largely reproduced allegations already
asserted by other publications. 200 Nevertheless, President Correa delib-
erately advocated that the court should find Palacio's allegations violated
Article 489-a provision that allowed for the most serious punishment.201
Given the IACHR's reaction to President Correa's suit against Palacio
and El Universo, it is likely the IACHR would have ultimately submitted
a case to the Inter-American Court if President Correa had not an-
nounced the pardon. The IACHR had requested Ecuador's government
suspend the judgment against Palacio and El Universo in light of the
192. Id.
193. El-Hage, supra note 160, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id. at 7 n.16.
197. Id.
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200. El-Hage, supra note 160, at iv.
201. See id. at 7.
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IACHR's upcoming hearing regarding the case on March 28, 2012, which
may not occur due to President Correa's recent pardon. 2 0 2 Ecuador's
government refused to abide by the IACHR's request, and Ecuador's
Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patiflo, referred to the IACHR's request as "a
clear violation of our country's institutions," implying that the IACHR
disrespected the authority of Ecuador's judicial system. 203 The IACHR
will likely not allow the multi-million dollar judgment against Palacio and
El Universo to establish a norm that would drive independent newspa-
pers into bankruptcy. Given that President Correa's suit against Palacio
and El Universo is not an isolated occurrence; the Inter-American Court
may still consider reviewing the issue of defamation laws in Ecuador,
even in light of President Correa's decision to pardon Palacio and El
Universo's executives.
President Correa is not alone in his use of criminal defamation tactics
to suppress speech.204 Other officials have also begun to file lawsuits
against journalists engaged in controversial work 2 0 5 For example, a pros-
ecutor filed criminal charges for defamation against three journalists, an
ombudsman, and El Diario's director. 2 0 6 The case is proceeding even
though a third party made the criticism and El Diario published the pros-
ecutor's reply.2 0 7 Similarly, the Minister of Transportation and Public
Works brought a defamation claim against a group of journalists who
mentioned the Minister's involvement with a contract in their book El
Gran Hermano.208 While some courts will likely dismiss officials' frivo-
lous defamation allegations, in July 2011, a criminal court sentenced a
radio commentator to five years in prison when a city mayor sued for
defamation because the commentator referred to the mayor as "a corrupt
rogue, a thief who has stolen city lands." 209 Despite officials' aggressive
approach toward their critics, organizations, such as Fundamedios, con-
tinue to challenge the lawfulness of criminal sanctions for insulting gov-
ernment officials.
202. El Universo Case: Ecuador Will Attend Hearing with IACHR, ECUADOR-
TIMES.NI (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.ecuadortimes.net/2012/02/27/el-universo-
case-ecuador-will-attend-hearing-with-iachr/.
203. Liliana Honorato, Ecuadoran Government Rejects Human Right Commission's Pe-
tition in El Universo Libel Case, JOURNALISM IN -THEi AM. (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:22 PM),
http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-9144-ecuadoran-government-rejects-
human-rights-commissions-petition-el-universal-libel-case.
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2. Challenge to Defamation Law in Ecuador: Article 230 of the
Criminal Code
On May 25, 2011, in Case No. 0026-11-IN, Fundamedios filed a lawsuit
in the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, challenging the constitutionality
of Article 230 of Ecuador's Criminal Code.210 Article 230 of Ecuador's
Criminal Code attaches a range of punishment from six months to two
years, as well as a small fine, for threatening or insulting the President of
the Republic or those who carry out executive functions. 211
Fundamedios views Article 230 as a form of desacato that inhibits the free
flow of expression in society, and accordingly, it requested the court abol-
ish this criminal penalty from Ecuador's law.2 12 Indeed, between 2008
and 2011, courts sentenced five journalists to prison due to defamation
suits under Ecuador's Criminal Code, and eighteen additional media em-
ployees defended suits against defamation allegations. 213
a. Summary of Fundamedios' Arguments
Fundamedios' brief relied on constitutional provisions from within Ar-
ticles 66 and 76 of Ecuador's Constitution, as revised in 2008, as well as
international human rights law. 2 1 4 Article 66 of Ecuador's Constitution
guarantees "the right to voice one's opinion and express one's thinking
freely and in all of its forms and manifestations." 2 15 Further, Article 76
of Ecuador's Constitution ensures due process of law, including "propor-
tionality between lawbreaking and criminal, administrative or other pun-
ishments" for all constitutional rights.216 Therefore, Fundamedios' brief
asserted Article 230 of Ecuador's Criminal Code violates the constitu-
tional principles in Articles 66 and 76.217 In addition, Fundamedios
pointed out that Article 424 of Ecuador's Constitution acknowledges that
the Constitution and international human rights treaties adopted by Ec-
uador supersede "any other legal regulatory system or action by public
power. "218
210. Amicus presentado ante de la Corte Constitucional de Ecuador [Amicus Brief Filed
Before the Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Hum. Rrs. WATCH (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/node/102969 [hereinafter Human Rights Watch's Amicus
Brief].
211. CO). PEN. art. 230 (Ecuador).
212. Demanda de Fundamedios por despenalizaci6n del delito de desacato en Ecuador
[Fundamedios' Suit for Decriminalization of the Offense of Contempt in Ecua-
dor], Tribunal Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Tribunal of Ecuador]
May 25, 2011, Case No. 0026-11-IN, available at http://es.scribd.com/doc/60977158/
Demanda-de-FUNDAMEDIOS-por-despenalizacion-del-delito-de-desacato-en-
Ecuador#archive (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Fundamedios' Suit].
213. Ecuador: Country Summary, Hum. RTs. WATrCH 2 (Jan. 2012), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/related material/ecuador_2012.pdf.
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Consequently, Fundamedios argued that Article 230 violates Article 13
of the American Convention and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, primarily because it punishes criticism of public offi-
cials with disproportionate criminal sanctions. 219 To support its argu-
ment, Fundamedios relied on the Inter-American Court's interpretation
of liberty of expression as a "fundamental and inalienable" right that is
essential for a democratic society.220 Moreover, it analyzed the Inter-
American Court's recent decision in Canese v. Paraguay to support the
argument that public officials do not deserve heightened protection
against criticism. 221 Instead, public officials should be more tolerant of
criticism due to their position in the public spotlight. 222 Fundamedios
also proposed that Ecuador's Constitutional Court should adopt a test of
actual malice, indicating that the Inter-American Court in Canese and the
United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan have em-
braced actual malice as the appropriate test for public figures. 223
Human rights groups, specifically Human Rights Watch and the Center
for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
(CELE), together filed an amicus brief on November 14, 2011, in support
of Fundamedios' challenge.224
The amicus brief focused on the international recognition that con-
tempt laws must be abolished and relied on the history of contempt laws,
the IACHR, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Human
Rights Committee of the U.N., and case law from the Inter-American
Court and European Court of Human Rights.225 Similar to the discussion
in Canese, the European Court of Human Rights has embraced increased
tolerance for the media's criticism of politicians, acknowledging that a
politician's honor must be balanced with "the interests of open discussion
of political issues." 2 2 6 Notably, the brief supported its argument for re-
peal of Ecuador's contempt law by demonstrating the trend of abolishing
contempt laws among Latin American countries within the region.227 In
order to comply with international standards, Argentina, Paraguay, Costa
Rica, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Uruguay have all gradu-
ally abolished contempt laws. 228
Although Fundamedios' proposal to repeal Article 230 does not elimi-
nate every provision within Ecuador's Criminal Code, the repeal of Arti-
cle 230 would represent monumental progress for Ecuador. Because
Article 230 specifically punishes individuals who offend or insult the Pres-
ident, Ecuador's Constitution, in essence, currently endorses President
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Correa's aggressive response toward critical journalists.229 Further,
Fundamedios is not the first group that has advocated for the repeal of
Article 230. In fact, in 2004, the Committee of Experts for the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption recommended Ecuador repeal
Articles 230, 231, and 232 because they discourage citizens' contributions
to civil society due to the lingering threat of a contempt offense. 230 On
April 25, 2011, fifteen members of the National Assembly signed a peti-
tion called Proyecto de Ley Derogatoria de los Articulos 230 y 231 del
C6digo Penal, supporting the repeal of Articles 230 and 231.231 In Octo-
ber 2011, the government proposed a revised criminal code to the Na-
tional Assembly, which eliminates desacato provisions, but retains
provisions requiring prison sentences for a maximum of three years for
defamation of public officials. 232 But even if the revised code passes, the
prison sentences for defamation gut the positive impact of the proposal
because officials will likely still threaten journalists with defamation suits.
Another critical area for freedom of expression violations is censorship,
as amendments to Ecuador's Democracy Code threaten the media's cov-
erage of the upcoming presidential election.
3. Censorship Increased by Amendment to Ecuador's Democracy Code
Despite Article 18's constitutional protection, censorship appears to be
escalating in Ecuador.233 As mentioned above, Article 18 of Ecuador's
Constitution guarantees the right to distribute and exchange speech or
information without censorship.234 But a recent law, effective as of Feb-
ruary 4, 2012, amended the Code of Democracy. 235 Human rights groups
predict this amendment will result in censorship of the media in the pe-
riod before, and during, the upcoming election campaign. 236 The law pro-
hibits the media from "direct or indirect promotion" of election
229. See Fundamedios' Suit, supra note 212.
230. Comm. of Experts, Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-Am. Conven-
tion against Corruption, Republic of Ecuador: Final Report, Feb. 2-6, 2004, at 25,
O.A.S. Doc. SG/MESICIC/doc.75/03 rev.4 (2004).
231. Memorando No. PAN-FC-01 1-0065 de Arq. Fernando Cordero, Presidente de la
Asamblea Nacional de la Rep6blica del Ecuador para Dr. Andr6s Segovia S.,
Secretario General [Memorandum No. PAN-FC-011-0065 from Arq. Fernando
Cordero, President of the National Assembly for the Republic of Ecuador to Dr.
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candidates, as well as distribution of campaign advertising, including
opinions and images. 237 The amendment will cause widespread censor-
ship, as political advertising will be prohibited in the press, radio, televi-
sion, billboards, and other forms of social communication. 238 Fines for
breaching the new law range from $50,000 to $100,000 in Ecuador's cur-
rency.239 President Correa defends this law as a necessary restraint to
ensure the media does not assume the role of "political actors" and to
eliminate "illegitimate, immoral power that certain media have." 240
a. Reaction by Human Rights Groups
Critics of the electoral law assert that media outlets should disregard
the law's restrictions, relying on the constitutional right to express resis-
tance within Article 98 of Ecuador's Constitution. 241 Article 98 states
that "[i]ndividuals and communities shall be able to exercise the right to
resist deeds or omissions by the public sector or natural persons or non-
state legal entities that undermine or can undermine their constitutional
rights or call for recognition of new rights."242 Referring to the law as a
"gag" law, critics project that it will result in not only the censorship of
journalists and radio broadcasters, but the censor of entities who would
otherwise endorse certain political candidates. 243 Further, the law will
deprive the population of information necessary to form an educated de-
cision about candidates.244 Notably, the President of the Committee on
Freedom of the Press and Information of La Sociedad Interamericana de
Prensa (SIP) stated that "[t]he new rule is a direct attack on press free-
dom and expression and the public's right to information." 2 4 5 Given the
animosity between President Correa and Ecuador's media, the timing of
the law is remarkably convenient because President Correa will evade
criticism if he runs in the upcoming election.
b. Legal Analysis
The amendment to the Democracy Code violates the guarantees of
freedom of expression within Article 18 of Ecuador's Constitution, Prin-
ciple 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, and
237. Id.
238. SIP califica "mordaza informativa" la ley electoral [SIP Gives "Scathing Report" to
the Electoral Law], ELDIARIO.EC (Jan. 16, 2012, 9:18 PM), http://www.eldiario.com.
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Article 13 of the American Convention. 246 Article 18 of Ecuador's Con-
stitution explicitly prohibits prior censorship "about the facts, events, and
processes of general interest, with subsequent responsibility." 2 4 7 There-
fore, the electoral law presumably violates Article 18 of Ecuador's Con-
stitution; however, when read in its entirety, the most pertinent limitation
in Article 18 seems to be the requirement that the information be "truth-
ful."2 4 8 If "truthful," as written here, means without bias, Article 18 may
not protect electoral coverage by media sources that associate with a par-
ticular sector of the voting population, whether conservative or liberal.249
Moreover, considering the broad prohibition of prior censorship within
Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,
the amendment likely contravenes the international consensus that any
form of prior censorship violates the right to freedom of expression.250
Principle 5 encompasses a broad right to express opinions, as it prohibits
"direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expres-
sion, opinion, or information" and states that limiting ideas and opinions
violates freedom of expression. 2 5 1 Article 13 similarly provides a broad
right to express ideas freely, explicitly prohibiting prior censorship. 252 if
journalists exhaust domestic remedies and challenge the law before the
Inter-American Court, the Court would likely rely on Article 13's stan-
dard. As discussed above, the Inter-American Court has established that
prior censorship is prohibited unless it falls within either of the two ex-
ceptions. 2 5 3 As this electoral law does not fall within either of the excep-
tions, it also potentially violates Article 13.254
While the electoral law was effective as of February 4, 2012, its impact
should remain unclear until a few months before the 2013 election. 255
Because the electoral law invokes an explicit prohibition on coverage by
media outlets, interpretive arguments in defense of journalists' rights are
likely moot.2 5 6 Moreover, journalists who are brave enough to challenge
the law probably risk their livelihood due to its substantial financial pen-
alties. Despite this paper's conclusion that the electoral law violates
prohibitions against prior censorship, journalists may have little or no re-
course when arguing under Article 18 of Ecuador's Constitution. 257 The
246. Fundamedios and AEDEP Challenge Constitutionality of Amendments to
Democracy Code, IFEX (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.ifex.org/ecuador/2012/02/09/
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following paragraph discusses another recent legislative development that
invokes prior censorship beyond the electoral context.
4. Proposed Communication Law (Ley Orgdnica de Comunicaci6n)
Endorses Censorship
Groups promoting greater liberty for the media have also become ap-
prehensive about the proposed communications law. In May 2011, Presi-
dent Correa instituted a referendum through which citizens ultimately
voted in favor of a law that would establish a Communication and Infor-
mation Council (the Council) as part of a proposed communications
law. 2 5 8 Final passage of the law is contingent upon the National Assem-
bly's approval. 259 The Council's primary function would be to protect
communication rights.260 But two provisions of the proposed law may
exacerbate the problem of governmental control over media content.
Under Article 72(a) of the proposed law, the media must broadcast offi-
cial messages from the government and state agencies without time limi-
tations as long as the topics are "relevant to the parties making them and
related to general interest." 261 Article 72(b) of the proposed law also
requires networks to broadcast any messages submitted by the President
of the Republic and other designated authorities. 262 Media groups sug-
gest that the Council will result in a regulatory organization that violates
Article 13 of the American Convention by "applying prior conditions to
information for it to circulate freely" and by exercising its discretion to
impose subsequent liability. 263 Further, UNESCO asserts the proposed
law's definition of the right to information ignores the right to express
opinions and ideas, as included in the American Convention. 264
The law burdens the media even further, from a licensing standpoint.265
The law will restore the requirement that journalists must belong to a
guild-despite the fact that Ecuador's Supreme Court previously held
such a requirement unconstitutional and the Inter-American Court's ad-
visory opinion in 1985 condemned the practice. 266 A guild is a profes-
sional group of journalists, which requires an academic degree for
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membership. 267 The rationale asserted for the guild requirement is to
"build[] conditions to ensure the quality and responsibility of the han-
dling of information."2 6 8 But the Inter-American Court opined that a
guild requirement violates Article 13(2) of the American Convention be-
cause it "unduly restricts the right of the public at large to receive infor-
mation from any source without any impediments." 2 6 9 The Inter-
American Court explained:
[R]easons of public order that may be valid to justify licensing of
other professions cannot be invoked in the case of journalism be-
cause they would have the effect of permanently depriving those
who are not members of the association to make full use of the rights
that Article 13 of the Convention grants to each individual.270
Because the guild requirement is a component of the proposed com-
munication law's aim to regulate the public's access to the media, the
proposed communications law is "depriving" independent journalists,
without affiliation to a guild, from exercising their right to freedom of
expression under Article 13.
Even prior to the proposed communications law, UNESCO's assess-
ment of Ecuador in 2011 indicated the government had resorted to Arti-
cle 80 of the General Regulations for the Law on Radio and Television
Broadcasting "as grounds to close or suspend media." 271 The Committee
to Protect Journalists likewise reported President Correa suspended all
broadcast media on hundreds of occasions to issue coercive political
messages to the population.272 While President Correa possesses a privi-
lege to stop broadcasting during times of emergency, President Correa
has misused the privilege as a mechanism of "official censorship and anti-
press harassment." 2 7 3 From January 2007 until May 2011, the President
interrupted television programming on 1,025 different occasions, amount-
ing to about 150 hours. 274
Although the National Assembly has previously approved every bill
proposed by President Correa's administration without amendment,
President Correa's proposed communication law will likely undergo mod-
ifications if the National Assembly ratifies it in the upcoming months. 275
Members of the dominant party, Movimiento Pais, which holds a majority
of sixty-three out of 124 seats in the National Assembly, have conceded
that they will consider amendments to the proposed legislation.276 The
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National Assembly held a debate in early January 2011, and the final de-
bate will likely occur in late February or the beginning of March 2011.277
Self-censorship has also emerged as a problem in Ecuador during the
Correa Administration, as the government has threatened journalists as a
means to control media content. According to the Reporters Without
Borders 2010 Press Freedom Index, Ecuador fell in its ranking from num-
ber eighty-four to 102 out of 178 countries. 2 7 8 This significant drop re-
sulted primarily from "violent acts, intimidations, and blocked activities
fostered by . . . media-related political polarization." 2 7 9 Fundamedios
compiled statistical data through interviews with 372 journalists.280 The
data revealed self-censorship, whether induced by verbal or written
threats, impacts media coverage.281 Approximately sixty percent of the
journalists surveyed had experienced threats or were aware of journalist
coworkers who had received threats. 282 Moreover, national surveys of
journalists showed the government has restricted the media recently due
to the vigorous attack by President Correa and his administration.283
Notwithstanding the persistent problem of threats to the media, jour-
nalists remain resilient in their battle to preserve respect for freedom of
the press.284 Nevertheless, the public has been directly impacted by the
loss of access to public information. Although self-censorship is a viable
concern in Ecuador, statistical data seems to indicate that direct censor-
ship, through the electoral law and the proposed communications law,
would have a more detrimental long-term effect on the status of freedom
of expression in Ecuador. Indeed, approximately forty-six percent of
journalists perceive limited access to information as the most significant
problem that inhibits freedom of expression and the press in Ecuador. 285
Both the proposed communications law and the electoral law pose a di-
rect threat to the public's ability to access information without the gov-
ernment intruding to ensure the message does not deviate from the
mainstream objectives of the State. Consequently, recent legislative
changes will likely deteriorate freedom of expression to the extent that
Ecuadorian citizens' access to basic information will be in jeopardy.
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom of expression is the "cornerstone" underlying every demo-
cratic society, and as this paper has asserted, threats to freedom of ex-
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pression are currently debilitating the societies in Chile and Ecuador.286
The Inter-American Court stated, "[w]ithout effective freedom of expres-
sion,... democracy is enervated, pluralism and tolerance start to deterio-
rate, the mechanisms for control and complaint by the individual become
ineffectual and, above all, a fertile ground is created for authoritarian
systems to take root in society." 287 In comparison with Ecuador, the
threat to freedom of expression is not as dire in Chile. But, most signifi-
cantly, the proposed amendments to Chile's Penal Code violate the stan-
dard of freedom of expression under numerous international instruments.
Furthermore, if the violence against protesters ultimately reaches the In-
ter-American Court, Chile would need to submit substantial evidence to
justify its suppression of protesters and reporting journalists. Moreover,
Chile's declining freedom of expression could be alleviated by rejection
of the proposed changes to the Penal Code and further action by the
IACHR regarding carabineros' violent reactions toward protesters. Con-
versely, President Correa is reviving an authoritarian system in Ecuador
through the suppression of free expression. Even U.S. media sources
have described President Correa's leadership as "a relentless campaign
against free speech" and as "the most comprehensive and ruthless assault
on free media underway in the Western Hemisphere." 2 88 Despite Presi-
dent Correa's recent pardon, independent journalists in Ecuador face a
precarious road ahead in the 2013 election due to the electoral law, the
proposed communication law, and President Correa's defamatory attacks
on journalists. Although human rights groups have questioned the con-
stitutionality of desacato laws, the State's proposal to the National As-
sembly demonstrates that the State is not yet willing to surrender its
control over journalists. The State's proposal is grossly inadequate be-
cause journalists will remain suppressed as long as the threat of criminal
punishment persists. Ecuador's hearing before the IACHR in March will
predict whether Ecuador will appear before the Inter-American Court
regarding President Correa's suit against Palacio and El Universo. Con-
sequently, Ecuador's emergent circumstances require revolutionary
change, including new presidential leadership, rejection of the proposed
communication law, and repeal of the electoral law and desacato
provisions.
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